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The Air Force is currently developing Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV).  The UCAV is projected for initial testing by 2010.  However, after reviewing 
the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap for 2005–
2030; obtaining squadrons of UCAVs will cost billions of dollars and require decades to 
produce.  The United States cannot afford to wait decades for unmanned weapons. 
Technology is spreading fast. Third world countries without stable economies and non-
state actors are able to obtain/develop sophisticated weapons that are capable of easily 
destroying tactical aircraft.  With sophisticated weapons obtainable, the risk of losing 
people in air combat is increasing significantly and that in turn is creating a level playing 
field for prospective U.S. adversaries.  Unmanned weapons technology can help America 
retain its military edge. However, since unmanned warfare capability is still decades 
away and is a multi-billion dollar project, America needs a quick fix.   This study will 
argue that the most effective way to decrease risk-of-life and budget costs is to introduce 
F-16 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) aircraft for combat.  This thesis will answer the 
question:  How can the government seize the unmanned aircraft advantages and decrease 
defense spending until the UCAV is operational?  The answer to this question will 
illustrate how an effective F-16 UAS force can synchronize resources to properly 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE FUTURE OF WAR  
One can only imagine what the future of war is going to look like.  Many fiction 
and non-fiction authors feel that future wars will be fought at home by the 
technologically advanced.  Imagine, by way of example, a country with a million-man 
militia and fleets of air, sea, and land craft — the largest standing military in the world.  
Imagine, too, that this country’s neighbor has ten thousand robots and unmanned air, sea, 
and land vehicles that can outmaneuver most defenses and easily target vital points of 
interest.  Even though the human militia outnumbers its foe 100:1 and was given an 80% 
chance of successfully destroying the unmanned army, would the country be willing to 
allow 10,000, 100,000, or 500,000 troops to die while their enemy loses none?  Is it 
worth losing thousands of people and billions of dollars in technology and infrastructure 
while their foe loses nothing but an unmanned arsenal that can be easily rebuilt?   
The thought that unmanned weapon systems will replace manned ones is coming 
to fruition.  The U.S. Department of Defense has created roadmaps for each unmanned 
system that will replace the current U.S. inventory of land, sea, and air vehicles.  This 
family of unmanned systems technology and capabilities will share similar attributes and 
operate in close coordination as a team (Office of Sec. Def., Aug 2005, pg 76).  The 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) mission roadmap (See Table 1) provides a timeline in 
which each air mission and aircraft will be replaced by a UAS.  According to the 
roadmap, unmanned aircraft will replace most fighters, cargo, passenger, and other 
mission aircraft by the year 2030.  One of the primary benefits of unmanned technology 
is the significantly reduced loss of life and money. 
The roadmap may seem very aggressive; but it will still take decades and billions 
of U.S. dollars to replace the current air inventory.  The United States cannot afford to 
wait decades for unmanned weapons.  Technology is spreading fast.  Third world 
countries without stable economies are able to obtain/develop sophisticated weapons that 
are capable of destroying U.S. aircraft.  With sophisticated weapons easily obtainable, the 
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risk of losing people in air combat is increasing significantly and that in turn is creating a 
level playing field for perspective U.S. adversaries. 
 
 
Table 1. UAS Missions Roadmap (Office of Sec. Def., Aug 2005.) 
 
Unmanned weapons technology can help America retain its military edge.  Since, 
however; unmanned warfare capability is still decades away, America needs a quick fix.   
This study will argue that the most effective way to decrease risk of life and budget costs 
is to introduce F-16 UASs for combat until a future unmanned weapon system can 
replace the inventory in Table 1.   
Before the discussion of F-16 UAS aircraft can be entertained, the advantages and 
disadvantages of UASs must be established.  By providing this information, one can 
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Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System 
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B. WHAT’S GOOD ABOUT UNMANNED AIRCRAFT? 
According to Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary, the definition of an 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is:  
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator uses 
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be 
piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal 
or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, 
and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles 
(Office of Sec. Def., Dec 2002, pg 16). 
Unmanned Aerial Systems have “a history as long as that of aviation itself” 
(Armitage, 1988, p. 1).  The first live experiments with unmanned aircraft started in the 
United Kingdom in 1917 when a simple pilotless aircraft, using a 35HP engine, was 
developed by Grandville Bradshaw (Armitage, 1988, p. 1).  Since then, UASs have 
advanced dramatically.  These advancements have finally reached a point that allows 
UAS theories to become reality.  There is a common theory that UASs are better suited 
for the “dull, dirty, or dangerous” missions than manned aircraft (Office of Sec. Def., 
Aug 2005, pg 1).  Military Aerospace Technology online defines the dull, dirty, or 
dangerous as: 
Dull—as in patrolling no-fly zones or very long intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance (ISR) missions; the UAS is just as alert in the last hour 
of its patrol as it is in the first hour. Dirty—as in operations in airspace 
potentially contaminated with biological or chemical weapons. And 
dangerous—as in electronic attack missions, often performed early in a 
battle while the enemy’s air defenses pose a serious threat (Barr, 2005). 
These three attributes make the use of unmanned flight a viable alternative to manned 
flight.  During the dull missions the alertness of machines is superior to that of humans, 
and for the dirty and dangerous, the political and human cost is lower, should the aircraft 
be lost. (Office of Sec. Def., Aug 2005, pg 2).  Even though the dull, dirty, and dangerous 
theory is an excellent argument for UAS development; there are other primary factors for 
UAS development that are not directly addressed.  These factors are risk-of-life, 
technological capabilities, decreased budget costs, and range and endurance capabilities. 
4 
1. Risk-of-Life 
Risk-of-life is a significant benefit that cannot be overlooked.  UASs literally 
bring the decision factor to risk a pilot’s life to zero.  No matter how easy or difficult the 
task, political leaders would never have to consider the risk-of-life dilemma again.  The 
dull, dirty, and dangerous theory only focuses on three mission areas in which UASs can 
prove advantageous, but in the risk-of-life decision, UASs can outweigh any mission.  
For example, according to the U.S. Air Force Legal Services Agency, 20 Class A 
aerospace mishaps occurred during Fiscal Year 2005 (Air Force Safety Center, 2006).  A 
Class A mishap is an accident that results in fatality or total permanent disability, loss of 
an aircraft, or property damage of $1 million or more.  Of those 20 mishaps, 
approximately 12 are easily identified as training missions and an additional 5 are 
identified as UASs, 4 of which were in combat. This means that 85% of all Class A 
mishaps are due to training missions and only 8.3% of those Class A training mishaps are 
from unmanned aircraft.  “Typically 80 % of the useful life of today's combat aircraft is 
devoted to pilot training and proficiency flying, requiring longer design lives than would 
be needed to meet combat requirements” (Pike, Dec. 2005).  Without the requirement to 
fly sorties to retain pilot proficiency, UASs will fly less frequently.  As a result, if the 
USAF were to replace all mission aircraft with UASs, there would be an 89.7% decrease 
in Class A accidents within the USAF.  In short, UASs have the advantage in all mission 
considerations when the loss-of-life factor is considered. 
2. Technological Capabilities 
Technology is another area in which UASs have the advantage over manned 
aircraft.  This is caused by limiting factors that the human physiology prevents certain 
capabilities from being utilized.  Currently under development is the X-45 Unmanned 
Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV). It is a future UAS that will have fighter-like 
performance characteristics that can provide over 10-hours of endurance while carrying a 
payload of bombs and missiles capable of using Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
laser-guided technologies (Stout, 2005 pg. 31).  Additionally, the X-45 UCAV will be 
virtually undetectable by radar.  This will be achieved via stealth capabilities provided by 
a “miniscule radar signature” (Brasher, 2005 pg. 37).  The X-45 UCAV has the benefit of 
eliminating the need for a cockpit which gives it the stealth advantage over existing 
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piloted stealth aircraft.  The “cockpit is a major source of radar return on manned aircraft, 
even stealthy ones” (Brasher, 2005 pg. 37).  Additionally, the X-45 UCAV will be able to 
withstand over 30 Gs of force during maneuvers.  One G-force is equivalent to the 
gravitational pull of the earth.  Most fighter pilots with years of training can withstand a 
maximum of 9 Gs for 10 seconds.  An increase of 21 G-forces will allow the UASs to 
achieve maneuvers never before imagined.  Finally, without the pilot there are multiple of 
unnecessary for flight.  These include an ejection seat, parachute, oxygen system, among 
others.  By not requiring these systems, the UAS benefits from having less payload for 
life support and more for endurance, and technology enhancements, along with smaller 
size to avoid enemy detection.  These advantages will reduce UAS maintenance 
requirements to half the current manned aircraft level. 
3. Decreased Costs 
Many critics feel that UAS research and development (R&D) costs are too high 
now that Congress is looking to significantly reduce spending.  According to Air Force 
Magazine, UASs “are now commanding some $2 billion a year of the DOD budget, 
UAVs will account for about $13 billion in production funding through the end of the 
Pentagon’s six-year plan” (Tirpak, Nov 2005).  When one examines the data more 
closely one will find that $2 billion a year is smaller than many other projects in the 
works.  For example, the F-22 cost over $38 billion in 1990 dollars for R&D alone.  This 
excludes the fact that one F-22 will cost $211 million to field and requires a pilot with 
many years of experience.  The X-45 UCAV is estimated to cost $8 million each, and 
will be more advanced than the F-22.   
Reusability is the key advantage the UAS has over cruise missiles, which can be 
used only once (Thompson, 2000).  Many military strategists feel cruise missiles are the 
answer to preventing risk to pilots. This was evident in Kosovo/Operation Allied Force.  
The tomahawk cruise missile cost between $1.1 and $1.2 million each in 2000 dollars 
(Thompson, 2000).  In contrast, an $8 million UAS with over ten weapons on board 
could prove more cost-effective than a cruise missile in a single flight, presuming that the 
UAS is able to destroy ten targets with its weapon arsenal.  This estimate also allows for 
a conservative $3 million for bombs, fuel, and one year of maintenance support 
(Thompson, 2000).  
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4. Range and Endurance 
With the aid of air refueling systems, the UAS is theoretically capable of limitless 
flight.  Without a pilot in the cockpit, there is no need to land the aircraft except for 
maintenance problems and re-arming.  However, if air refueling assets are unavailable, a 
UAS is still capable of longer flight times and ranges.  This is due to less drag from the 
canopy and cockpit and more room to carry fuel.  Some UASs are capable of flying for 
days over enemy territory (Thompson, 2000).   
 
C. WHAT’S BAD ABOUT UNMANNED AIRCRAFT? 
Unmanned aerial systems do have some disadvantages that need to be worked 
out.  The primary disadvantages are bandwidth and jamming.  Additionally, some critics 
feel that UASs have a higher probability of crashing, prevent a proper field of view, and 
eliminate the decision process from the cockpit.  They is also pose an ethical dilemma 
that will be discussed in Chapter V of this thesis. 
1. Bandwidth 
There are primarily two basic approaches to implementing unmanned flight, 
unmanned autonomist flight and pilot-in-the-loop (Office of Sec. Def., Aug 2005, pg 48).  
There are many existing definitions for unmanned autonomous flight, but, for the 
purposes of this thesis I will define it as: An unmanned flight system with the ability to 
complete or abort a mission without human intervention.  This definition refers to 
unmanned systems that have the ability to make strategic and tactical decisions on their 
own. Autonomous flight is an important factor in UAS technology since it would enable 
the UAS to complete its missions without intervention.  As a consequence, bandwidth 
and jamming disadvantages would be significantly reduced. However, the 2005 UAS 
Roadmap indicates this type of technology will not be available until 2015-2020 (48).  
Since this thesis is addressing current technology the more relevant type of unmanned 
flight is pilot-in-the-loop.  Pilot-in-the-loop will be defined as: an unmanned flight 
system that is under human control.  This means that the unmanned aircraft will be 
completely under the control of a pilot from a location other than the aircraft.  For 
purposes of this thesis, we will refer to UAS as always meaning pilot-in-the-loop 
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technology.  The UAS requires communications technologies that can provide the ability 
to fly the aircraft.  Some of these technologies are: 360 degree real-time visual access 
(video), manual control to fly the aircraft and utilize its weapons (data), and positioning 
capability (GPS).  Communications technologies like these require, a lot of bandwidth.  
According to webopedia; bandwidth is:  “The amount of data that can be transmitted in a 
fixed amount of time” (2006).  Today, telephone lines, satellite dishes, and other forms of 
communications systems can only transmit a limited amount of bandwidth per-second.  
This is why bandwidth is a huge problem with UASs.  Since bandwidth is limited, loss of 
UAS control can occur from latency, link loss, and/or poor video feeds.   Additionally, 
the bandwidth problem limits the number of UASs that can be flown at the same time.  
Currently, time is the only fix to the bandwidth problem.  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense believes technology is increasing at an exponential rate and the demand for 
bandwidth will remedy itself in time.  However, if UAS technology is to succeed, the 
bandwidth situation must be immediately addressed and fixed. 
2. Jamming 
UASs require bandwidth to control, orient, and push/receive data, which makes 
jamming a very effective tool.  Jamming is an ability that allows one to interfere with the 
transmission of information from one point to another (Adamy, 2001, pg. 177).  Jamming 
becomes effective when one can make a signal strong enough to prevent a system from 
recovering the required information from the desired signal (Adamy, 2001, pg. 177).  It is 
a dangerous threat to all air, land, and sea systems that require some form of 
communications; however, it could be lethal to a UAS.  If a UAS is properly jammed it 
could lose control and be destroyed.  This is not necessarily a problem with a manned 
system because the pilot can still fly the aircraft without many of the aircrafts 
instruments.  There are many ways to avoid/deter jamming from occurring, but this is a 
serious threat that could prevent a UAS from completing its mission.  Engineers would 
need to develop a default system that would allow the F-16 UAS to retreat to a neutral 





D. BONE YARD UAS 
A bone yard UAS is an existing or retired fighter or bomber aircraft that has been 
converted into a remotely piloted aircraft.  By no means is this new technology, but it is a 
new concept.  Companies have been converting old weapons systems into target drones 
for decades.  “The first pilotless Target drones were developed for the U.S. Army Air 
Force in the late 30s” (Airshots, 2001).   When the Jet age arrived, the need for missile-
based combat increased.  This drove a need for target drones with realistic performance. 
Since then, companies have been converting small batches of early jet types for pilotless 
flight.  British Aerospace (BAe) is one such company.  It has converted over 500 F-86, F-
100, F-5, F-106, and F-4 aircraft into drones (BAe systems, 2005, June).  All drone 
aircraft are given the designator of Q to identify them as drones.  BAe is currently 
developing QF-4s.  It has already completed 175 (BAe systems, 2005, June).  Conversion 
of each QF-4 takes around 18 weeks at Mojave Airport, California. On arrival, each 
Phantom is stripped down for inspection and modification.  “On completion, the airframe 











Figure 1.   QF-4E 68-0345 was the first conversion. (Airshots, 2001) 
 
The QF-4 is fully capable of Combat Air Maneuvering with or without a 
pilot. Missions can be fully automated from take off to landing, including 
4g barrel rolls and 6g slices. The aircraft is also fully supersonic. 
Formations of up to 4 can be flown unmanned, relying on GPS systems to 
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maintain spacing. These QF-4’s are fully operational at both Tyndall and 
at Holloman AFB and is the only (known) full size target drone in use 
with the USAF at present (Airshots, 2001).  
BAe is currently working on the last group of F-4s that will be converted into 
drones (BAe systems, 2005, June).  The next phase of Q aircraft is going to be the F-16.  
More than 4,000 F-16s have been made and are used by two dozen countries (Schonauer, 
2005, November). Of these 4,000 F-16s, the United States has bought over three quarters 
of them. The bone yard contains over 1,800 of these retired F-16 airframes (Dewitt and 
Vanhastel, 2006).  Instead of developing QF-16s for missile testing, there is the prospect 
of developing them for combat.  The “USAF can quickly provide a cost-effective 
unmanned military option by modifying bone yard or currently operational F-16 fighters 
into UASs” (Thompson, 2000).  According to Michelle Burdick at BAe; “the F-16 
drone/UAS could be developed and online within approximately 12-15 months” 
(Michelle Burdick, personal interview, January 26, 2006) 
 
E.  SUMMARY 
 Even though there are a few drawbacks, UASs are the future American aerial 
weapons system.  However, the X-45 UCAV is still decades away.  As a result, the 
USAF is planning to increase its manned combat fighting forces with multi-billion dollar 
investments that will be terminated when the X-45 UCAV is ready for combat.  The F-16 
UAS is a cheap alternative that could save lives and the American taxpayers well over 25 
billion dollars.  This thesis will make an in-depth cost comparison (Chapter II, F-16 UAS 
vs. an F-16 and F-22); will present a Nash arbitration model (Chapter III, F-16 UAS vs. 
the F-16 and F-22); and will consider use of the F-16 UAS in a real world scenario 



























II. THE F-16 UAS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The American government is undergoing substantial budget cuts and needs to find 
the best avenues to decrease government spending within the Department of Defense.  
Consequently, the government is looking at  the F-22 and F-35 manned fighter programs.  
These programs are costing billions of dollars in research and development (R&D) 
expenditures and hundreds of millions of dollars for each aircraft.  Not only are these 
aircraft expensive, but the personnel to fly and maintain them significantly increase in 
costs.  Even though these weapons systems are very expensive, the U.S. Air Force insists 
that they are necessary for air superiority. Since future UCAV requirements are to replace 
all manned aircraft by the year 2030 is it worth wasting billions of dollars on systems 
that will be phased out in less than 25-years?  Chapters II and III will be dedicated to 
answering this question. This chapter will discuss some necessary design modifications to 
the F-16, and provide a dollar cost comparison of the F-16 UAS vs. the manned F-16 and 
F-22 projects.  Chapter III will show how the F-16 UAS is the best option for Congress 
and the U.S. Air Force by utilizing of the Nash arbitration game theorem. 
 
B. F-16 UAS 
Given BAe’s contributions success, one can see that any aircraft within the U.S. 
inventory can be easily converted into a drone.  So, why use the F-16?  According to 
Major William L. Hartzfeld, 510th Fighter Squadron Intelligence Officer for Operation 
Allied Force; “high risk missions such as surface-to-air missile (SAM) hunting and 
double-digit SAM (SA10, 20, etc.) suppression is the Air Forces biggest risk area for 
pilots.  The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has clearly said that the F-22 is needed to 
counter the SAM and 5th generation aircraft threat” (personal communication, July 14, 
2006).  The F-16 currently handles most of the SAM hunting missions and it will 
probably continue to bear the load in the future (Bolkom, April 2001).  Since the F-16 is 
already the primary tool for high risk missions like the SAM threat, then why not simply 
increase its chances success.  Additionally, the F-16 is a multi-role fighter. “It performs 
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all USAF missions such as SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses], DCA 
[Defensive Counterair], OCA [Offensive Counterair], killer scout, deep strike, 
interdiction, and CAS [Close Air Support].  No other aircraft in the U.S. military can 
explore the unmanned doctrine in so many areas of combat” (Thompson, 2000).   In 
addition to its flexibility, the F-16 is also the most numerous weapons system available in 
the U.S. inventory.  This large inventory is a key factor in the proper transition from 
manned to unmanned F-16s.  It allows for mishaps during the initial exploration of the 
concept, proper training, long term investment for the future of the system, and continued 
flight of manned F-16s during the transition.  Given all these benefits, probably the most 
compelling reason for creating an F-16 UAS is simplicity.  During an interview with Mr. 
Paul Plate, BAe Systems program support services stated; “The F-16 would be very easy 
to convert since it is a fly by wire system” (Paul Plate, personal communication, January 
26, 2006).  Since the F-16 is a fly-by-wire system the drone transition does not need any 
mechanical servos or hydraulic changes.  The conversion would only require the 
installation of an on board computer and some communications modifications.   This 
simplicity would significantly reduce the cost of the F-16 UAS.  Converting the F-16 into 
a drone may be very simple, but the need to ensure survivability is also important.  By 
implementing small but important design modifications the F-16 UAS could easily 
outperform its current manned counterpart.  
 
C. BASIC DRONE MODIFICATIONS 
The basic requirements in converting an F-16 to a UAS revolve around flight 
controls and communications. Engineers will need to incorporate computer systems that 
can fully control all aspects of the aircraft.  This will allow the aircraft to be completely 
controlled remotely for flight.  Communications equipment is also required for remote-
control operation and sensor feedback to the ground operator (Thompson, 2000).  “One 
possible location for engineers to put this datalink hardware is in the vertical fin base 
originally designed to hold the cancelled USAF airborne self-protection jammer internal 
electronic warfare system” (Thompson, 2000). Rough estimates from BAe on converting 
an F-16 into a UAS of this capacity run about $2 million each.  However, this type of 
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drone will only provide the government with a system that is equivalent to the F-16 and 
the only advantage would be its remote flight. 
A few simple modifications would increase the UAS’s capabilities significantly.  
Radar detection is always a great concern and the UAS’s radar signature could be 
decreased by removing the large canopy required to house a pilot and replacing it with a 
radar absorbing cover.  By decreasing the drone’s radar signature, its survivability rate 
increases.  In addition, Paul Plate from BAe feels that removal of the ejection seat, and 
decomposition chamber would significantly decrease the on-board weight significantly 
(Paul Plate, personal interview, January 26, 2006).  This decrease in weight could allow 
for an increase in range by installing a 2300 pound cockpit fuel tank (Thompson, 2000).  
This cockpit tank would increase the F-16 UAS’s range by approximately 200 nautical 
miles in combat (Thompson, 2000).  One other possible enhancement could be a small 
camera mounted near the front of the aircraft at a lookup angle so the remote ground 
operator could remotely re-fuel the aircraft from a tanker (Thompson, 2000).  If this 
enhancement were implemented the cockpit fuel-bladder would be unnecessary, leaving 
significant weight allowance for more on-board ordinance. 
According to BAe experts, removing the hydrazine tank (a 56lb device used as a 
last ditch effort to safely fly an F-16 with mechanical problems to the ground) would 
provide the perfect space for an on-board remotely activated self-destruction system 
(Paul Plate, personal interview, January 26, 2006).  A self-destruct system would provide 
a safety net for a drone that is having mechanical problems and cannot land safely or 
preventing it from getting into enemy hands if shot down.  
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Figure 2.   Lockheed Martin artist design of an F-16 UAS. (Thompson, 1998) 
 
F-16 product support engineers and BAe experts agree that the F-16 is limited to 9 
Gs due to its weak wings (Torres E. Torres, personal interview, November 17, 2005, & 
Paul Platte, personal interview, January 26, 2006).  The F-16 wings have problems with 
what are called finger braces.  There are only four of these braces in the top and four on 
the bottom of the wings design.  This faulty design constantly creates fractures within the 
wings when the aircraft exceeds its 9-G limit (Paul Platte, personal interview, January 26, 
2006).  By re-enforcing the F-16 finger braces or re-designing its wings, the F-16 could 
possibly increase its G-limit by three to six additional Gs.  In addition to re-designing the 
F-16’s wings, the utilization of vectored engine thrust would significantly enhance the F-
16 UAS’s maneuverability.  A rough estimate of a drone with these modifications would 
increase its cost by more than $4 million.  This estimate does not consider any research 
and development (R&D) costs. It also does not consider any operational or maintenance 
costs.  However, R&D costs would be relatively insignificant compared to the $38 billion 
F-22 R&D funds already spent.  F-16 UAS R&D costs may be as low as $20 million or 
as high as $500 million. 
 
D. A F-16 UAS, F-16, AND F-22 DOLLAR COST COMPARISION 
The following comparison is not perfect.  It was developed by accessing 
information from Congressional budgets, and on-line sources.  However, to prevent a 
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bias for UAS technology, this cost comparison always assumes the worst estimates for 
the F-16 UAS the best estimates for the F-16 and F-22.  By doing a cost comparison in 
this way, it provides a fairer estimation of the costs related to the three systems.   
 
 
Figure 3.   F-16 (Left) and an F-22 (Right) 
 
1. Aircraft Costs 
 The F-22 is reported to have a unit purchase price of $211.815 million per aircraft 
(DTIC, 2006, February). This cost has changed throughout the past few years due to 
Congressional demands for the number of aircraft required for delivery.  However, this is 
the current estimate used within the Department of Defense budget proposal from the 
2007 Operational System Development request.  
The F-16 costs $18.8 million for the currently used C/D model (Air Combat 
Command, 2006, June) 
As discussed earlier the approximate cost of a drone conversion is $4 million.  
However, for the benefit of the doubt, I will bump this cost analysis up to $5 million. 
2. Aircrew Costs 
The F-22 is a single-seat multi-role fighter/attack aircraft.  While initially only 
experienced, highly qualified pilots will be assigned to the aircraft, eventually a steady 
state will be reached and lower ranking, less experienced pilots will be allowed to fly the 
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aircraft.  Still, the F-22 is highly complex aircraft and it is unlikely that brand new pilots 
will be allowed to fly the jet.  Additionally, to make the best use of their resources, 
fighter squadrons are typically assigned more pilots than aircraft.  This is usually referred 
to as “crew ratio.” (Riden, 2005, December) The standard crew ratio is 1:1.3 pilots or the 
number of aircraft assigned to a squadron times 1.3 pilots.  (Riden, 2005, December) 
However, because of the high reliability built into the aircraft, it is estimated that F-22 
squadrons will be allotted a 1:2.5 crew ratio. (Riden, 2005, December) 
The F-16 is very similar to the F-22 in roles, but its reliability is not as high.  As a 
result, it must use the standard 1:1.3 crew ratio. 
While the UAS is unmanned, it still will need pilots to fly it.  However, since it is 
unmanned, training pilots is much less expensive since simulators can be used for most of 
their training.  Additionally, the drone does not require one pilot to fly one aircraft.  
According to Dr. Dave Netzer at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Multiple UAVs can be 
flown by a single pilot” (D. Netzer, Lecture, January 2006).  This type of capability 
would allow one pilot to fly dozens of drones to a certain destination. Once in combat, a 
one-to-one pilot/aircraft ratio may be required.  This process will reduce the burden of 
crew rest and the crew ratio required.  Since pilot availability will increase, the crew ratio 
would decrease.  This means an assumption of one pilot would be required to operate 
three drones, creating a crew ration of 3:1. 
The average cost of one fighter pilot is approximately $8.3 million. The following 
values were used to assume these valuations.  
a. Average Time in Military:  8-years (Riden, 2005, December) 
b. Average Salary per year:  $85,000 (Military Connection, 2005) 
c. Approximate Training Costs:  $7,000,000 
d. Flight Bonus:  $220,000 
e. Death Insurance:  $400,000 
Though the total costs for a F-16 UAS would be less due to cuts in training and 
possibly flight bonus, this thesis will not change aircrew costs. 
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a. RESULT:   
i. F-22 Total Aircrew Cost = $8.3 Million X 2.5 crew ratio = $20.75 
Million 
ii. F-16 Total Aircrew Cost = $8.3 Million X 1.3 crew ratio = $10.79 
Million 
iii. F-16 UAS Total Aircrew Cost = $8.3 Million X a 3:1 or (1/3) crew 
ratio = $2.76 Million 
3. Maintenance Costs 
Most flying squadrons have an associated maintenance unit.  This is not part of 
the flying squadron, but is responsible for the aircraft.  Because this thesis is not 
constrained to buying whole squadrons of aircraft, we will attempt to determine the 
number of maintainers required per aircraft.  Because aircraft maintenance troops do vary 
an average salary will be applied. Additionally, a $1 Million dollar annual equipment cost 
per aircraft will be applied. 
b. Current F-16 fighter maintenance units have about 8.6 maintainers per 
aircraft (Riden, 2005, December).  However, the F-22 is reported to require only about 
half this number.  This would produce a figure of 4.3 maintainers per aircraft (Riden, 
2005, December). The drone maintenance average is very difficult to arrive at.  After a 
detailed discussion with BAe engineers and maintainers no real ratio could be derived.  
Nevertheless, we know there is no requirement for a life support maintenance crew since 
the drone is unmanned.  These risk-of-life inspections include egress and life support 
equipment that are the most stringent of all the required inspections (Paul Platte, personal 
interview, January 26, 2006).  Since these inspections would be deleted, the complete 
egress back shop could be cut out. Additionally, BAe experts agreed that the number of 
maintainers required for routine maintenance and flight preparation could easily be cut in 
half.  This is because the F-16 UAS will only fly for tests and combat, and won’t be 
needed for continual flight training. This does not mean that the F-16 UAS will not need 
routine inspections.  Even though it may not fly as often as a manned F-16, it will still 
need preventive maintenance checks.  In addition, according to Colonel Brian H. 
Greenshields, Naval Postgraduate School Special Operations Command Chairman, 
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“current unmanned weapons systems are required to fly at least every 72 hours for air 
worthiness checks” (Brian H. Greenshields, personal interview, July 5, 2006).  Even 
though the number of maintainers required for an F-16 UAS may be fewer than for the F-
22, for the purposes of this thesis the same ratio as the F-22 will be employed. 
c. The average cost of one maintainer is $520,000 each. The following 
values were used to arrive at this figure: 
i. Average Time in the Military:  4 years (Riden, 2005, December) 
ii. Average Salary per year:  $22,500 (Military Connection, 2005) 
iii. Approximate Training Costs:  $30,000 
iv. Bonus:  N/A 
v. Death Insurance: $400,000 
d. RESULT:   
i. F-22 Total Maintenance Cost = $520,000 X 4.3 maintainers + $1 
Million= $3.24 Million 
ii. F-16 Total Maintenance Cost = $520,000 X 8.6 maintainers + $1 
Million= $5.72 Million 
iii. F-16 UAS Total Maintenance Cost = $520,000 X 4.3 + $1 
Million= $3.24 Million 
 
4. Summary of Results 
By taking the calculations and assumptions of all the items discussed in the 
paragraphs above Table 2 below was created.  As one can see the dollar costs differing 
considerably.  The F-22 can be considered more expensive while the F-16 and F-16 UAS 
seem significantly less expensive.  However, dollar costs alone can be deceiving.  In the 
next chapter, the Nash Arbitration model will be used.  This model, with the aid of some 
technical considerations not within this dollar cost comparison, will illustrate why the F-
22 is more cost effective than the F-16.  However, this argument does not hold water 





Per Aircraft F-16 F-22 F-16 UAS 
Aircraft Cost 18,800,000 211,000,000 5,000,000 
Aircrew Cost 10,790,000 20,750,000 2,760,000 
Maintenance Cost 5,720,000 3,240,000 3,240,000 
Total Cost Each Aircraft 35,310,000 234,990,000 11,000,000 
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III. THE NASH ARBITRATION MODEL 
A. WHAT IS THE NASH ARBITRATION MODEL? 
The Nash Arbitration Model was designed by mathematician, John Forbes Nash, 
Jr. It is a theory he developed in 1949, which showed that competitive behavior among 
decision-makers leads to a non-optimal equilibrium. This was a radical idea which 
challenged the classical economic theory of Adam Smith that free competition leads to 
the best results and the Darwinian Theory that natural selection leads to improvement of 
the species.  His non-optimal arbitration theory is the reason why systems like the F-22 
are approved by Congress. It is a process that simulates two groups of people with 
diametrically opposed interests and provides a solution that is in some sense fair and 
acceptable to both groups. By utilizing the Nash arbitration model one can prove that the 
obvious choice may or may not always be the best choice.  The model is now widely used 
throughout the world to settle arguments through negotiations.  This chapter will utilize 
the Nash Arbitration model to compare the F-16 versus the F-22 and the F-22 versus the 
F-16 UAS.  By going through this exercise, one will understand why the F-22 is a valid 
and acceptable to Congress but it should also show how the F-22 argument is inferior 
when compared to the F-16 UAS. 
 
B. ARGUMENT ONE: THE F-16 VERSUS THE F-22 
1. Players   
Air Force air superiority versus Congressional budget cuts 
2. Concern  
What should the Air Force develop to minimize budget costs and maintain air 
superiority until the UCAV fleet is available in 2030?  Should the Air Force develop 





3. Assumptions  
For the purposes of this thesis let’s assume that Congress wants to decrease 
budget spending in this area of concern to $1.5 billion per year until the UCAV fleet is 
ready.  This will provide a total budget of $37.5 billion.   
This analysis will be based on the aircraft purchase price, aircrew costs, and 
maintenance personnel costs provided in Chapter II.  Additionally, it will consider two 
other factors not discussed in Chapter II: kill ratio, and service of life.  
i. The Aircraft kill ratio and service of life are important 
factors when considering an aircrafts value.  Kill ratio is the 
aircrafts ability to survive in combat.  If an F-16 fought an F-16 the 
kill ratio would be 1:1 since they would be similar weapons 
systems.  However, if an F-16 were to fight an F-22 the results 
would be very different.  Considering this ratio can change the 
option to purchase considerably.  For example, the kill ratio for the 
F-22 vs. the Russian-built SU-35 is considered to be a 1:10 ratio 
(Chairforce, 2006).  This means that one would have to buy 10 SU-
35 aircraft before they would be equivalent threat to a single F-22.  
The best way to determine a kill ratio is to create a standard.  Let’s 
say the F-16 is the primary platform.  This means that the F-16 will 
have a value of one and it will have a kill ratio of 1:1. The SU-35 
is reported to have a 1:10 ratio and the F-16 is reported to have a 
1.5:1 ratio against the SU-35 (Chairforce, 2006). By using these 
two calculations, an F-16 to F-22 kill ratio of 15:1 can be 
extrapolated.  
ii. Service of Life (SoL) is another important consideration. 
This is the expected number of flight hours an aircraft can fly 
before it needs to be retired.  The F-22 is estimated to have a 9000 
flight hour SoL (FAS, 2000, April).  The F-16 is known to have a 
6000 flight hour SoL (FAA, 2005, December).  If the USAF flies 
these aircraft approximately 10 hours a week, an assumption of 
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520 flight hours per year can be made.  If these aircraft are flying 
520 hours per year, then the F-22 has a SoL of 17.3 years 
(9000/520) and the F-16 has a SoL of 11.5 years (6000/520).   
A 10% loss of aircraft and aircrew also needs to be factored in due to crashes and 
combat.   
This thesis will assume that Congress and the USAF would like to replace 75% of 
the entire F-16, and 100% of its aging F-15 inventries over the next 25 years.  Since the 
F-15 is the USAFs current Air Superiority aircraft and there is no real kill ratio for the F-
15 we will assume that the F-15 has a 1:3 kill ratio.  Since there are 738 F-16s and 396 F-
15s in the Active Duty USAF fleet, the government requirement would replace an 
equivalent of 1742 F-16s ((396 F-15 x 3 Kill ratio) + (75% x 738)).  If an equivalent 
number of 1742 F-16s is unattainable given a $37.5 billion cap then the closest solution 
to that cap would be best.  If this solution is obtainable, then the least expensive solution 
would be best. 
Figure 8 describes the results.  It provides values that can be utilized to find the 
perfect F-16 and F-22 mix. The Total Value of Each Aircraft is the Total Cost of Each 
Aircraft times 25 years divided by Service of Life multiplied by Loss of system/life then 
divided by the kill ratio.  This number provides the value of each aircraft to sustain the 
equivalent airpower of one F-16 for 25 years. 
  
Per Aircraft F-22 F-16 
Aircraft Cost 211,000,000 18,800,000 
Aircrew Cost 20,750,000 10,790,000 
Maintenance Cost 3,240,000 5,720,000 
Total Cost Each Aircraft 234,990,000 35,310,000 
Kill Ratio 15:1 1:1 
Service of Life 17.3 yrs 11.5 yrs 
Loss of system/life 10% 10% 
Total Value of Each Aircraft  24,097,974 62,545,522 
25 year goal equivalent to F-16s 1742 1742 
$ Cap 37,500,000,000 37,500,000,000 




On a scale of 1-to-4, with 4 being the best and 1 being the worst option, this 
argument assumes the rankings below for both parties: 
a.  The U.S. Air Force 
In this project we assume the primary concern for the Air Force is Air 
Superiority. Air Superiority is its primary concern because the mission of the U.S. Air 
Force is to defend the United States and protect its interests through air and space power. 
To achieve that mission, the Air Force has a vision of Global Vigilance, Reach, and 
Power (USAF, 2000). That vision orbits around three core competencies: Developing 
Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations (USAF, 2000). These 
core competencies yield six distinctive capabilities. One such capability is Air and Space 
Superiority (USAF, 2000). The Air Force feels that with Air Superiority it can dominate 
enemy operations in all dimensions -- land, sea, air, and space (USAF, 2000).  Since Air 
Superiority is the top priority, the F-22 holds the most utility (Score of 4).  The second 
highest payoff (Score of 3) would be a mix of F-22s and F-16s.  The F-16 is an aging 
platform that American adversaries have or will have the capability to outperform or 
destroy within the next few years.  Even though the F-16 is aging, the Air Force would 
rather have a mixture of weapon systems than nothing at all. The third highest payoff 
(Score of 2) would be to buy only F-16s.  If the USAF has to abandon the F-22 at least it 
can have new F-16s to replace the aging fleet. Lastly, the lowest payoff (Score of 1) 
would be no new aircraft until the UCAV fleet can replace the existing inventory.  This 
would become a logistical nightmare for the Air Force and increase maintenance costs 
significantly. 
b.  Congress 
Congress understands that Air Superiority is  key to possessing to the most 
powerful military in the world.  However from its perspective, there are many other 
factors that must be considered:  1) Budget costs must be reduced to cut the deficit 2) The 
risk of losing our soldiers in combat must be prevented 3) It is critical to the needs of the 
American people as a whole and 4) The UCAV fleet will be on line in 2030 and all active 
manned aircraft will be replaced.  By taking these factors into consideration Congress is 
likely to prefer a mixture of F-16s and F-22s.  This is their highest payoff (Score of 4).  
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The F-22 is the future and would be a great, it is an expensive weapon system compared 
to the F-16 and F-16s can be easily modified to integrate future technologies.  
Additionally, multiple companies will be in business producing both systems, thereby 
decreasing the unemployment rate.  This makes a mix of F-22s and F-16s the best 
solution. 
Since the F-16 is so versatile Congress chooses the F-16 as its second 
highest payoff (Score of 3). The average fighter pilot of 8-years is valued at 
approximately $8.3 million dollars.  This is after considering training, flight bonus, death 
insurance, and annual pay.  The risk of losing a life is an awful decision to make, but a 
necessary one.  Since the cost of a new F-16 is so much less then an F-22 and the UCAV 
will replace the current fleet within 25 years the risk of life is not as important.  The next 
highest payoff (Score of 2) is to develop nothing. Maintenance costs do tend to increase 
substantially over time, but the cost of maintaining an old aircraft fleet vs. the costs for an 
F-22 fleet would be less over 25 years.  Finally, the least payoff (Score of 1) is to develop 
all F-22s.  This would be a multi-billion dollar investment for only a 25-year period.  
Congress is projected to feel this is not a good solution. 
5. Nash Arbitration Grid 
It is truly difficult to determine the actual utility of each of these rankings for the 
Air Force and Congress without directly talking to decision makers themselves.  
Therefore, this thesis assumes that the ordinal utility of these rankings equals the cardinal 
utility; that is four is two times as good as two and so forth.  Making this assumption is 
necessary in order to apply the Nash Arbitration.  With this in mind, the Nash Arbitration 
two-person game produces the following results: (See Figure 4) 
The two-person game shows that both the USAF and Congress have a dominate 
strategy.  The USAF wants to choose the row “buy F-22s”.  This row will allow it to 
purchase the F-22 in full or partially.  Congress, on the other hand, has the dominate 
strategy to choose the column “buy F-16s”.  This column prevents them from fully 
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      Buy F-16        Don’t Buy F-16 
            Buy F-22 
USAF 
 Don’t Buy F-22 
 
Figure 4.   Arbitration grid USAF vs. Congress, F-22 and F16 
 
By choosing the (3, 4) point the USAF will not get all F-22s but only a mix of 
both aircraft. This is not its optimal choice, but it is better than nothing. Congress is very 
happy with the results.  It can buy both aircraft, keeping budget costs down, risking less 
life since the F-22 is a more advanced weapons system, and keeping the American people 
happy since there will be more jobs.  When these assumptions are graphed, the following 










Figure 5.   Nash Equilibrium USAF vs. Congress, F-22/F16 
 
6. Strategic Moves 
The graph in Figure 4 shows that the outcome is (3,4).  Point (3,4) is to purchase a 
mix of F-22s and F-16 aircraft.  However, as the information is reviewed, the (3,4) point 
is not the optimal point for both sides. This is due to the fact that the Air Force is not 
getting what it wants most. The optimal solution does exist, but it lies within the Pareto 
Likely Nash Equilibrium 
without an Arbitrator
Pareto Optimal Solution Set
3, 4 4, 1 
2, 3 1, 2 
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Optimal Solution set line.  Before the USAF opts to bargain with Congress it decides to 
see if there are any strategic moves that can be exercised. A strategic move is something 
that can force the opposition to choose a less optimal option. There are three types of 
strategic moves within an arbitration model.  These moves are the first move, the threat, 
and the promise.  What strategic moves are available to the USAF within Figure 5?  
a. Is there a FIRST MOVE for the USAF during this argument? A first move 
provides the ability to act on a decision first.  It is something that must be considered, 
since it may help increase one’s chance of obtaining the best solution.  For example: a 
parent has two ice cream cones, one with chocolate ice cream, the other with coffee.  His 
two children dislike coffee ice cream and instead both desire the chocolate.  The child 
who moves first will get to pick the option he wants, leaving the other child with what is 
left over.  By looking at the USAF’s options for a first move, we can see how this would 
give it an advantage over Congress. 
i. If the USAF’s optimal solution is to buy F-22s and Congress’ is to 
buy F-16s the result would be block (3,4)  
ii. If the USAF tries to be deceptive and chooses the ‘Don’t Buy F-
22s’ row, Congress would choose the ‘Buy F-16s’ Column.  This 
would result in block (2, 3).  This block would put the USAF in a 
worse position than option A. RESULT:  Since the USAF is unable 
to better its position by taking the first initiative it does not have a 
first move. 
b. Can the USAF wield a THREAT?  A threat is something that forces the 
opposition to choose something other than its optimal solution.  For example, a family 
wants to go out to the movies to see a film for which they have been waiting months.  
However, the parents also want their children to eat all their vegetables during dinner. 
The children hate eating their vegetables.  The parents choose to coerce the children into 
eating their vegetables by telling them that unless the do so, they will spend their time at 
home in bed and not go to the movies.  The parents know that this threat would also ruin 
their night out.  By utilizing this threat, the children are forced to choose to eat the 
vegetables and enjoy the movie or go to bed.  Neither choice is optimal, but one is much 
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better than the other.  By looking at the USAF’s options regarding a threat, one can see 
whether it can force Congress to make a decision that will favor the USAF.  
i. USAF wants Congress to pick the ‘Don’t Buy F-16s’ row in Figure 
6.  So, if the USAF threatened Congress to select the ‘Don’t Buy 
F-16s’ block by picking another option would it better its position? 
The answer is NO. The only other option for the USAF would be 
to select the ‘Don’t Buy F-22s’ block if Congress didn’t choose the 
‘Don’t Buy F-16’s’ block.  This option would actually favor 
Congress. RESULT:  The USAF does not have a THREAT.   
c. Does the USAF have a PROMISE?  A promise is an agreement 
that allows both sides to work together for an acceptable solution.  For example, a 
teenager wants his parents to buy him a new car. The parents can’t afford to buy him one 
but are willing to let him use their Yugo.  The teen does not want to be a laughing stock 
at school by being seen in a Yugo, so he makes a promise to get a job and pay for the car 
on his own if his parents will sign the loan papers.  This promise is not optimal for either 
side, but it does allow their teenager to get a new car even though it means he’ll have to 
get a job. 
i. USAF wants Congress to pick the ‘Don’t Buy F-16s’ block in 
Figure 6.  So, If Congress takes ‘Don’t Buy F-16s’ then the USAF 
will promise to take ‘Don’t Buy F-22s’. RESULT:  The USAF 
does not have a PROMISE because it will not get its optimal 
solution. 
The USAF’s final conclusion is that it has no strategic moves to better its 
situation.  As for Congress, there is really no need to look for a strategic move.  It is 
already getting its best choice and knows that the USAF has no strategic moves. The best 
solution is unquestionably a mix of F-22s and F-16s. An analysis of the two is necessary 
to see what the best mix should be.  This is done by taking the estimated values of both 




7. The Optimal Mix 
The optimal mix can be discovered by using two separate techniques.  One 
technique is to find the Minimal Annual Cost to obtain the 1742 F-16 replacement 
requirement.  This calculation would be subject to: X = # of F-22s; Y = # of F-16s, 15X + 
Y >= 1742.  The X value for F-22s would be 15 times the value of Y since there is a 15:1 
kill ratio.  The second technique is to find the maximum mixture of aircraft subject to an 
annual cost.  This calculation would be: X= # of F-22s, Y= # of F-16s, Max 15X + Y is 
Subject to Annual Cost <= Annual Budget. Both equations would utilize the following 
calculation to discover the Annual Cost of both the F-22 and F-16: 
                 
        [((1.1) 25/17.3 (211,000,000) + (1.1 x 20,750,000) + 3,240,000)/15] + [(1.1) 25/11.5 (18,800,000) + (1.1 X 10,790,000) + 5,720,000)]/25 
 
Using an application in Microsoft Excel called Excel Solver one can easily 
determine the optimal mix equation.  As shown below in Table 4, utilizing both the 
minimal annual cost to maximize efficiency the USAF would be very happy with the 
results.  Even though the best decision is to develop a mix of both F-22s and F-16s, the 
15:1 kill ratio theoretically forces Congress to buy all F-22’s.  However, even though the 
best result is to buy 103 F-22s over the next 25 years there is no possible way to obtain 
the 1742 efficiency goal with the total budget cap. The maximum efficiency rate capable 
is only a 1545 F-16 equivalent.   This Nash Arbitration argument is one of the reasons 
why the F-22 is such a powerful lobbying tool in Congress.  Its efficiency rate is able to 
defend its high cost.   
 
x y EFFICIENCY Cost Total Budget 
103 0 1545 $37,231,371,300.58 $37,500,000,000 
     
  GOAL   
  1742 Annual Cost  
   $1,489,254,852.02  




C. ARGUMENT TWO: THE F-22 VERSUS THE F-16 UAS 
1. Players   
Air Force air superiority versus Congressional budget cuts 
2. Concerns 
What should the Air Force develop to minimize budget costs and maintain air 
superiority until the UCAV fleet is available in 2030?  Should it develop the F-22 or the 
F-16 UAS?  
3. Assumptions:   
a. As with the previous argument, the F-16 versus the F-22, this analysis will 
be based on the aircraft purchase price, aircrew costs, and maintenance personnel costs 
provided in Chapter II.   
b. Additionally, the kill ratio and Service of Life for the F-22 will be the 
same as in the previous argument.  The drone is an unknown.  However, after long 
discussions with engineers, if the $5 million version of the drone was developed, a safe 
F-16 to F-16 UAS kill ratio may be 4:1.  However, for purposes of this thesis a 2:1 F-16 
to F-16 UAS kill ratio will be used. 
Even though engineers have stated that the Service of Life (SoL) for the F-16 
UAS would be the same as the F-16 there is difficulty in believing this.  The F-16 UAS is 
a system that would be developed from old airframes.  So instead of giving the F-16 UAS 
a complete 6000hrs SoL this thesis will only assume a 4500hr SoL for the F-16 UAS.  
That is 25% less than a new F-16.  However, another consideration is that the F-16 UAS 
will be flown significantly less than the F-16.  This is due to a reduction in pilot training.  
Since pilots do not need to fly the actual aircraft to maintain their required flight hours 
the F-16 UAS requires less flight time per year.  Since the F-16 UAS will be flown less 
than the F-16 annually the actual years in service changes. An assumption that the F-16 
UAS will only fly 4-hours per week will be considered.  This makes an annual flight 
requirement of 208 hours.  As a result the F-16 UAS SoL is 21.6 years (4500/208).  
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c. We should assume a 10% loss of aircraft is a factor due to crashes and 
combat.  However there will not be a 10% loss of aircrew since there are no pilots in the 
UAS. 
4. Options:  
On a scale of 1-to-4, with 4 being the best option and 1 being the worst option, 
this thesis assumes the rankings below for both parties. 
a. The U.S. Air Force 
Once again, Air Superiority is a top priority for the USAF.  Even though 
the F-22 has a better kill ratio the F-16 UAS has the unique capability of being 
unmanned.  This allows the USAF to insert combat aircraft into hostile high risk areas 
without worrying about Loss of life or loss of high value equipment.  This would lead the 
Air Force to seek a mix of F-22s & F-16 UASs having the highest utility (score of 4).  
The second highest payoff (score of 3) would be to purchase only F-22s.  The F-16 UAS 
is a very unique piece of equipment but it is far less advanced then the F-22.  The third 
highest payoff (score of 2) would be to buy only F-16 UAS.  If the USAF had to abandon 
the F-22 at least it can have a F-16 UAS fleet to replace the current one.  Lastly, the 
lowest payoff (score of 1) would be no new aircraft until the UCAV fleet can replace the 
existing inventory. 
b. Congress  
Congress would likely feel that the F-16 UAS represents the perfect 
solution its budget cut, its concern over loss of life, and its need to meet the needs of the 
American people as a whole, the UCAV fleet is on line in 2030.  This gives the F-16 
UAS the highest payoff of a (4).  A mix of F-22s and F-16 UAS earns the next highest 
payoff of a (3).  A payoff of (2) is to develop nothing. Maintenance costs do tend to 
increase substantially over time but the cost to maintain an old aircraft vs. the costs for a 
new F-22 fleet are minimal for a 25-year period. Finally, the least payoff (1) is to develop 
all F-22s.  This would be a multi-billion dollar investment for only a 25-year period.  




5.  Nash Arbitration Grid 
As in the previous example, it is truly difficult to determine the actual utility of 
each of these rankings for the Air Force and Congress without directly asking the 
decision makers.  Therefore, this thesis assumes that the ordinal utility of these rankings 
equals the cardinal utility; that is, four is two times as good as two and so forth.  Making 
this assumption is necessary in order to illustrate the Nash Arbitration.  With this in mind, 
the following Nash Arbitration two person game results (See Figure 6): 
The two-person game shows that both the USAF and Congress still have a 
dominate strategy.  The USAF wants to choose the row ‘Buy F-22s’.  This row will allow 
it to purchase the F-22 in full or partially.  Congress, on the other hand, has the dominate 
strategy to choose the ‘Buy F-16 UAS’ column.  As the result, the Nash point without an 
arbitrator will be (4, 3).  This answer has reversed from the F-16/F-22 comparison. By 
introducing the F-16 UAS, the USAF gets its top choice and Congress gets its second 
best choice. 
 
USAF vs. Congress Game:  
 
              Congress 
            Buy F-16 UAS  Don’t Buy F-16 UAS 
           Buy F-22 
USAF 
  Don’t Buy F-22 
 



























Figure 7.   Nash Equilibrium USAF vs. Congress, F-22 and F-16 UAS 
 
5. Strategic Moves 
The graph in Figure 6 shows that USAF and Congress would choose the Nash 
equilibrium of (4,3).  Point (4,3) is to purchase a mix of F-22s and F-16 UAS aircraft.  
Even though the result to have a mix of F-22s and F-16 UAS is the same as in the 
previous calculation, the graph is quite different.  By introducing the F-16 UAS we not 
only have a Nash Equilibrium, it is also the Pareto Optimal solution. Since the Nash 
Equilibrium and Pareto Optimal solution are equivalent, there is no need to search for a 
Strategic Move. 
6. Optimal Mix 
Since the best solution is a mix of F-22s and F-16 UASs, an analysis of the two is 
necessary to see what the best mix should be.  This is done by taking the estimated values 
of both aircraft to minimize cost, but increase efficiency. For this calculation, information 
discussed in the assumptions section of this argument will be considered.  Figure 3 is the 
result of listing the six F-22 and F-16 UAS considerations.  It provides values that can be 




Likely Nash Equilibrium 
without an Arbitrator
Pareto Optimal Solution Set
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Per Aircraft F-22 F-16 UAS 
Aircraft Cost 211,000,000 5,000,000 
Aircrew Cost 20,750,000 2,760,000 
Maintenance Cost 3,240,000 3,240,000 
Total Cost Each Aircraft 234,990,000 11,000,000 
Aircraft Efficiency 15:1 2:1 
Service of Life 17.3 yrs 21.6 yrs 
Loss of system/life 10% 10% not on life 
Total Value of Each Aircraft  24,097,975 10,197,870 
25 year goal equivalent to F-16s 1742 1742 
$ Cap 37,500,000,000 37,500,000,000 
Table 5. Costs/Value and Assumptions for Optimal Efficiency Calculation USAF vs. 
Congress, F-22/ F-16 UASs 
 
Once again we will discover the optimal mix by utilizing the Minimal Annual 
Cost to obtain the 1742 F-16 replacement requirement.  This calculation would be subject 
to: X = # of F-22s,  Y = # of F-16 UASs, 15X + 2Y >= 1742. The second technique 
is to find the maximum mix of aircraft subject to an annual cost.  This calculation would 
be: X= # of F-22s, Y= # of F-16 UASs, Max 15X + 2Y is Subject to Annual Cost <= 
Annual Budget.  Both equations would utilize the following calculation to discover the 
Annual Cost of both the F-22 and F-16 UASs: 
 
             [((1.1) 25/17.3 (211,000,000) + (1.1 x 20,750,000) + 3,240,000)/15] + [((1.1) 25/21.6 (5,000,000) + 10,790,000 + 3,240,000))/2]/25 
 
Using the Excel Solver application for both optimal mix equations the answer can 
be easily determined.  As shown below in Figure 9, utilizing both the minimal annual 
cost to maximize efficiency there is a significant difference in results.  Instead of 
developing only F-22s, the equation requires the development of only F-16 UASs.  
Additionally, the F-16 UAS allows the USAF and Congress to reach the optimal 
efficiency goal and cut the total budget by 71%. That is a savings of $26.73 billion.  This 




x y EFFICENCY Cost Total Budget 
0 871 1742 $10,770,560,185.19 $37,500,000,000 
     
  GOAL   
  1742 Annual Cost  
   $430,822,407.41  
Table 6. Minimal annual Cost/Max Efficiency for F-22/F-16 UAS Solution 
 
D. SUMMARY 
Using the Nash Arbitration model with an optimal efficiency calculation, one is 
able to prove that the F-16 UAS can significantly enhance the USAF’s capabilities for the 
25-year transition period.  It allows the USAF to reach its efficiency goals, significantly 
reduce total budget costs, and reduce the risk-of-life factor to zero.  As a result, the F-16 
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IV. KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (OAF) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to Martin Libicki: “For the United States and its allies, people are 
expensive; stuff is cheap. Silicon is getting cheaper, and casualties are growing 
prohibitively expensive.  Thus, as any economist would argue, it makes sense to 
substitute what is getting cheaper for what is getting more expensive—that is to substitute 
as much silicon for casualties as one can” (Libicki & Shapiro, 2003).  The U.S./NATO 
campaign in Kosovo was the perfect operation to underscore Martin Libicki’s statement.  
NATO depleted over 99% of its precision weapons and developed limitations on 
engagement to protect its personnel from getting killed.  These limitations eroded NATO 
forces’ effectiveness.   By utilizing deception techniques, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) was able to avoid NATO attacks, force NATO to waste billions of 
dollars, and embarrass both military and political leaders.   This chapter will discuss the 
Kosovo/OAF campaign, the FRY’s deception techniques, and how the F-16 UAS aircraft 
could have been utilized to thwart deception, maintain NATO goals, and save money. 
 
B.  BOSNIA/OAF SITUATION  
In December 1990, Slobodan Milosevic was elected to be the first President of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Subsequent to his rise in power, he undercut Kosovo’s 
autonomy and implemented severely repressive policies that excluded Kosovar Albanians 
from virtually all positions of responsibility, even though ethnic Albanians made up 90 
percent of Kosovo’s population (U.S. DoD, 2000).  These actions led to a pattern of 
increased instability in the Balkan region (U.S. DoD, 2000).  Yugoslavia and the Balkans 
as a whole immersed in a series of increasingly violent armed confrontations.  Between 
1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia/Herzegovina forcibly seceded from 
Yugoslavia, while Macedonia did so peacefully. The break-up of Yugoslavia was 
endorsed by a number of international powers that recognized the right of self-
determination of all nations except the Serbs who wanted to continue living in greater 
Yugoslavia. Milosevic did not agree with the separation and between 1992 and 1995, he 
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instigated wars in Slovena, Croatia, and Bosnia.  These wars led to NATO involvement.  
In 1998, Serbia incited systematic ethnic violence against the Kosovar Albanians, 
precipitating a crisis that compelled the international community and NATO to act on the 
diplomatic and military fronts (U.S. DoD, 2000).  Even though the Serbian leader agreed 
to refrain from attacks, violence in Kosovo quickly resumed.  “While blocking 
international diplomatic efforts, Milosevic was finalizing a barbaric plan for expelling or 
forcing the total submission of the Kosovar Albanian community” (U.S. DoD, 2000).  On 
March 20, 1996, the day after peace talks were officially suspended, Serbian forces 
launched a major offensive and began driving hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians 
out of their homes and villages, summarily executing some of them, and setting fire to 
their houses (U.S. DoD, 2000).  These acts of violence forced the United States and its 
NATO allies to turn from a path of diplomacy to the use of force.  The military campaign 
was dubbed as Operation Allied Force (OAF) led by the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, General Wesley Clark.   
NATO and the United States expressed three primary interests during the crisis. 
First was to stop Serbian aggression in Kosovo.  This aggression directly threatened 
peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of southeastern Europe.  The second was 
to halt repression in Kosovo.  This repression created a humanitarian crisis of staggering 
proportions.  The third and final interest was to reverse Milosevic’s challenge to the 
credibility of the NATO alliance.     
In response to these primary interests the United States and NATO set specific 
strategic objectives for their use of force in OAF.  According to a 2000 report to 
Congress, these objectives were to: 
• “Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in 
the Balkans” (U.S. DoD, 2000).  
• “Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians 
and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing” (U.S. DoD, 2000). 
• “Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread 
the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to conduct military 
operations” (U.S. DoD, 2000). 
39 
These objectives were to be met in five phases under NATO’s operational plans.   
o Phase 0 was the deployment of air assets into the European 
theater (U.S. DoD, 2000).  
o Phase 1 would establish air superiority over Kosovo 
(creating a no-fly zone south of 44 degrees north latitude) 
and degrade command and control and the integrated air-
defense system over the whole of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (U.S. DoD, 2000).  
o Phase 2 would attack military targets in Kosovo and those 
Yugoslav forces south of 44 degrees north latitude, which 
were providing reinforcement to Serbian forces in Kosovo.  
This was to allow targeting of forces not only in Kosovo, 
but also in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia south of 
Belgrade (U.S. DoD, 2000).   
o Phase 3 would expand air operations against a wide range 
of high-value targets throughout the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (U.S. DoD, 2000).  
o Phase 4 would redeploy forces as required (U.S. DoD, 
2000). 
The Congressional after report action on the conflict shows that the primary 
objectives for OAF were to be accomplished through air operations only.  These 
operations relied predominantly on cruise missiles and restricted manned aircraft 
bombings.  Since OAF was limited to using air assets under strict rules of engagement, 





C. THE CAMPAIGN 
The OAF campaign was not the simple desert scenario that the U.S. military and 
some of the NATO nations were used to.  In Operation Desert Storm, acquiring targets of 
interests in the middle of the desert was relatively straightforward.  Once a target was 
acquired, Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to hide his assets unless he buried 
them under the sand.  Even though he could bury his assets, it was not something that 
could be done, quickly, and if done it would prevent the use of the assets when needed. In 
contrast, Yugoslavia presented environmental obstacles which aided in the creation of 
limitations to air attacks and the development of a powerful deception campaign for the 
FRY.  The environment was key to the results. 
1. Environment 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991 the United States had dramatically 
decreased its overseas basing of military forces.  Consequently, the success of OAF 
hinged on the combat capability of deployed forces in areas far from the OAF area of 
concern.  In an interview with Major TJ Hamrick, the Chief of Intelligence weapons and 
tactics and Deputy Chief of Coalition mission planning cell for OAF, he felt that this 
distance significantly hampered the effectiveness of the combat pilots.  He stated that; “It 
took so long to fly from Germany and Italy to Kosovo that the pilots had no time to 
accurately debrief their missions because of crew rest limitations” (T.J. Hamrick, 
personal interview, December 12, 2005).  Not only were the pilots tired from the length 
of the flight, they were fatigued from continual flights day after day.  
The terrain and weather in the Balkans were also a challenge.  The Balkans are a 
rugged mountainous region covered in forests.  “The rough, mountainous terrain was 
ideal for hiding or disguising military activity, as opposed to the desert terrain 
experienced in Iraq” (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003)  Additionally, the air operations during 
OAF were hampered by bad weather a significant portion of the time (U.S. DoD, 2000).  
Cloud cover was greater than 50 percent more than 70 percent of the period of operations 
(U.S. DoD, 2000).  The rough terrain and adverse weather affected target acquisition and 
identification, increased risk to aircrews, complicated collateral damage concerns, and 
allowed unimpeded air strikes only on 24 of the 78 campaign days (U.S. DoD, 2000).   
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The final key to the OAF environment was the Serbian air defenses.   The Serbian 
arsenal was antiquated but plentiful.  The systems ranged from antiaircraft artillery and 
man-portable air defense systems to Surface-to-Air missiles (SAMs).  These technologies 
except for the SAMs, were systems developed in the 1950’s through the 1980’s that 
could not reach above 15,000 feet (Thomas, 2000).  Even though these systems were 
antiquated, the terrain and weather made it difficult for American and NATO forces to 
accurately account for them.  Since it was difficult to account for the entire Serbian air 
defense system it became a significant threat to air assets 24 hours a day 7 days a week.  
Certain Serbian SAMs were capable of reaching altitudes above 15,000’, but did not tend 
to challenge NATO aircraft because they would have been quickly destroyed. 
2. Limitations 
As Libicki’s statement at the beginning of this chapter reminds us.  “People are 
expensive,” and General Wesley Clark was not going to risk his people being harmed.  
According to Major TJ Hamrick; “General Clark felt the OAF conflict was not worth 
risking any of his pilots” (T.J. Hamrick, personal interview, December 12, 2005).  Since 
General Clark did not want to put his pilots in harms way, his objective was to utilize 
cruise missiles as much as possible.  In addition, Major Hartzfeld 510th Fighter Squadron 
Intelligence Officer during OAF, stated that; “all combat missions were not allowed to go 
below the 15,000 foot deck” (William L. Hartzfeld, personal interview, December 12, 
2005).  Other than their SAM systems the Serbian defense forces did not have any other 
anti-air weapons system that could reach above the 15,000 foot deck. 
The 15,000 foot restriction was not the only limitation American and NATO 
forces were required to abide by.  Pilots were also only allowed to fire upon a target once 
they had visually identified it in order to limit collateral damage (Thomas, 2000). 
Another restriction was a politically imposed rule of engagement (ROE) that aircraft were 
not allowed to land with unexpended ordinance on board (Thomas, 2000).  Landing with 
unexploded ordinance on an aircraft provides undue risks to the aircraft and its pilot.  
However, since the Balkans had poor weather and the pilots were fatigued it was difficult 
to properly identify targets.  This forced NATO pilots to drop millions of dollars worth of 
ordinance in the Adriatic Sea (Thomas, 2000).  
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3. Deception 
To prevent extensive loss in valuable assets and to protect their defensive posture, 
Serbian forces employed camouflage, concealment, and deception tactics extensively. 
“The deception operations appeared to focus on reducing Allied success in the air 
campaign, protecting limited Serbian air and ground equipment, humiliating NATO, and 
affecting world opinion” (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003).  Even though the Serbs were 
unsuccessful in preventing NATO forces from destroying many of their key fixed 
installations such as television and radio stations, petroleum and oil facilities; their efforts 
enhanced the survival of Serb forces and the majority of their combat power (U.S. DoD, 
2000).   
With a little intelligence, a clear understanding of the physical and political 
environment, and ingenuity, the FRY was able to employ an inexpensive deception plan 
that avoided extensive damage and created a political nightmare for NATO.  Its first step 
towards success was knowing when reconnaissance flights would be conducted, or when 
satellites flew overhead (Thomas, 2000).  This information allowed the FRY to 
preposition its valued assets and allow them to be to be picked up as targets.  Once the 
reconnaissance missions were complete, the Serbs would hide the actual targets. “They 
used natural cover such as woods, tunnels and caves, civilian homes, barns, schools, 
factories, monasteries, and other large buildings to hide their personnel and weapons” 
(U.S. DoD, 2000). This exchange process usually took place under the cover of night. 
Their decoy techniques were archaic.  The decoys consisted of fake artillery pieces made 
of long telephone poles painted black with old truck wheels, fake bridges along the Drina 
River, antiaircraft missile launchers constructed of old milk cartons, and wooden mock-
ups of MIG-29 aircraft (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003) (See Figures 1 & 2) These types of 
decoys were used to replace most mobile tactical targets and some fixed ones. 
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Figure 8.   Serbian Artillery Decoy  
 
Figure 9.   Serbian Surface-to-Air Missile Launcher Decoy 
 
Since this war was only an air campaign, the lack of NATO ground forces and an 
over reliance on overhead reconnaissance made the implementation of cheap decoys such 
as seen in Figures 1 and 2 extremely effective.  NATO forces would utilize their 
reconnaissance information to create new targets. These targets were then placed on an 
air tasking order that prioritized them for destruction.  This listing would be used to 
assign the targets to aircraft and sea craft for action.  Once a submarine or other naval 
vessel received its targets, it would program a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) 
to destroy the target.  TLAMs are only GPS programmable and have no way of 
distinguishing a decoy from the real target.  One TLAM costs around $1.2 million 
(Thompson, 2000).  If the target was given to a B-52, it would then utilize a Conventional 
Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM).  This type of missile is similar to the TLAM and 
costs approximately $1.9 million dollars (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003).  According to the 
Kosovo/OAF after action report from Congress:  
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Cruise missiles were used extensively in the first few days of OAF and 
during the periods of adverse weather.  These weapons were selected to 
match NATOs campaign strategy.  In particular, the desire to limit the 
exposure of manned aircraft in the threat area, as well as the need to 
minimize collateral damage, made cruise missile employment a logical 
choice. . . . Sea-launched and air-launched cruise missies (TLAM and 
CALCM) . . . provided the capability to penetrate enemy air defenses and 
attack a wide spectrum of targets throughout the battlespace (U.S. DoD, 
2000).  
As stated above, only 24 of the 78 days were clear enough for aircraft to drop 
bombs on targets.  This meant the initial part of the campaign and 54 other days must 
have been dedicated solely to guided missile attacks.  When air assets such as the F-16 
were utilized to attack ground targets, the pilots were able to identify the targets by sight, 
but could not differentiate a decoy from the actual thing.  Pilots do have great vision but 
from 15,000 feet no one can accurately identify an actual asset from a fake without 
proper technical support. Additionally, pilot debriefings and gun camera video did not 
furnish the necessary detail that might have been obtained if the missions were flown at a 
lower altitude, for example, identification of secondary explosions on targets (Johnson & 
Meyeraan, 2003) Without proper Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) intelligence 
analysts were unable to determine the success of their attacks until national overhead 
systems could capture current BDA information (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003)   
Another form of deception utilized by Serbian forces was the integration of 
military convoys with those of displaced civilians.  “This both disguised their movement 
and protected them from NATO aircraft as a result of NATO rules of engagement 
(ROE)” (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003).  This deception technique provided the Serbians 
with a powerful media weapon.  Even if a convoy of troops was properly identified and 
destroyed, the Serbian army would place bloodstained dolls amongst the casualties to 
amplify the fact that NATO was killing the innocent (Thomas, 2000).  Whenever the 
international media photographed a site like this, the footage would put undue pressure 
on campaign efforts.  This pressure forced still more NATO restrictions on combat 
engagement and eroded support for the campaign.    
Even though Serbian deception tactics were rudimentary at best, they were able to 
significantly increase the costs of the war and undermine NATO’s credibility.  If Serbian 
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forces had been able to implement tactics that were more technically sophisticated than 
the ones they did employ, there is no telling what the outcome might have been. 
4. Campaign Results 
The results of the Kosovo/OAF campaign were ambiguous.  Since Serbian 
deceptions were widely utilized, and accurate assessment of the situation has never been 
accurately reached.  According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Henry Shelton, the total strike assessment for OAF was 120 tanks, 220 Armored Personal 
Carriers (APC), and 450 artillery pieces (Johnson & Meyeraan, 2003)  These figures 
were never verified.  The Congressional after action report stated that their assessment 
provided in their report (shown in Figure 3) “provides no data on what proportion of the 
total mobile targets were hit or the level of damage inflicted on the targets that were 
struck.  Instead, the numbers of target hits were collected” (U.S. DoD, 2000).  This 
means that they can only verify having hit something, but there is no assurance that the 
numbers of actual targets destroyed are accurate. An article in “Aviation Week and Space 
Technology reported that NATO had dropped 3,000 precision-guided weapons that 
resulted in 500 hits on decoys, but destroyed only 50 Yugoslav tanks” (Thomas, 2000).  
Although the government was unable to provide an accurate account of the battle 
damage, independent reporters investigating the situation offered an entirely different 
assessment.  Their assessments were done by driving throughout the countryside and 
taking a first-hand, on-the-ground look at of the destroyed targets.  The following 
information was discovered: 
Indications were that only 13 Serb tanks and fewer than 100 armored 
personnel carriers had been destroyed.  Reporters noted the ruins of many 
different types of decoys hit by NATO forces (e.g., rusted tanks with 
broken parts, wood or canvas mock-ups). Carlotta Gall of The New York 
Times, a veteran war correspondent from the first Russian war in 
Chechnya, saw little damage (Thomas, 2000). 
Even after researching through many documents on the Kosovo/Operation Allied 
Campaign, I can find no data that refutes this independent assessment. There is even a 
report citing, the British Ministry of Defense saying “the damage done to tanks was even 
less than the lowest quoted figure of 13 tanks killed” (Thomas, 2000).  Corroboration 
may also come from a comment given by a soldier who went into Kosovo after the air 
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campaign was over. As he said; “The only thing I know is that there were hundreds of 
Serbian tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons in convoys leaving the country as we 
entered it.” 
 
Figure 10.   Strike Assessment Results for OAF 
 
Even though there is no real assessment of the damage inflicted on Serbian forces 
there is a lot of information on what it cost.  The Congressional report states: “six ships 
and three submarines from two U.S. Navy battle groups and one UK submarine launched 
218 missiles in preplanned and quick-reaction strikes” (U.S. DoD, 2000).  This means in 
TLAMs alone cost NATO and America over $216 million.  Not to mention the $2.5 
million per day cost to maintaining operations of each naval battle group within the area. 
Two battle groups costing $2.5 million per day times 78 days equals $195 million. An 
additional 80 CALCMs were deployed from B-52s.  Just the cost for CALCMs was over 
$152 million, not to mention the costs of flying a B-52 and its crew to the proper 
destination in order to launch the weapon system.  The TLAM and CALCM efforts in 
OAF depleted the whole NATO inventory and resulted in the approval of a defense 
spending request of $1.4 billion to replenish the stocks (Office of Secretary of Defense, 
1999).  One evaluation found online reports that the Kosovo/OAF campaign cost 
approximately $1 billion per month in 1999 dollars (Wilkins, 1999).   
Even though General Wesley Clark’s primary concern was not to risk his pilots’ 
lives in combat, the campaign resulted in two aircraft shot down.  One aircraft was an F-
16 Fighting Falcon and the other an F-117 stealth fighter.  These downed aircraft required 
an increased risk of life to save the downed pilots.  According to Major Kent Landreth, 
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lead pilot during the downed F-16 rescue mission, “we needed to send a rescue team of 
three H-53 helicopters and 39 people to get the one pilot out” (Kent Landreth, personal 
interview, July 16, 2006).  Search and Rescue teams are required to extract downed pilots 
from harm’s way.  Each team contains helicopters that must fly at low levels to drop off 
teams of highly trained personnel that must search for the pilot.  One manned aircraft 
being shot down places dozens of individuals at risk.  Fortunately, the pilots from both 
crashes were saved and minimal damage occurred to the rescue teams  
NATO and America were able to stop Milosevic and his troops from committing 
atrocities in the Balkans.  However, it does not seem that they were able to inflict heavy 
damage on Serbia’s capacity to wage war in the future.  According to the evidence, it 
seems the damage to the Serbian army was minimal and NATOs reputation degraded as 
an effective fighting force.  This raises the question: Was the $1 billion a month cost 
worth it?  Many people do not think so.  I, personally, feel that a campaign to stop ethnic 
cleansing is worth every last penny a nation can spend.  However, I feel that the money 
should be spent in a way that will best meet the demands of the cause in the least costly 
way available.  Utilizing million dollar cruise missiles to destroy a $50 decoy is not 
money wisely spent.  Could there have been a better way to execute the Kosovo/OAF 
campaign without wasting so many tax payers’ dollars and risking life?  In the 90’s there 
may not have been.  Unmanned Combat Aerial Systems (UCAS) were just a dream.  
Drone technology did exist but the technology to properly utilize drones to fight a war 
did not.  If one was to take the Kosovo/OAF campaign and put it in the year 2009, then 
the answer to the question would have been YES.  A drone F-16 utilized as a combat 
vehicle could have changed the conduct and outcome of the campaign significantly.  
 
D. THE F-16 UAS 
The campaign in the Balkans may have been fought the best possible way with 
what leaders had available at the time, but it was also the perfect environment for the use 




1. Limitations  
Self-imposed limitations were the biggest factors that affected NATO’s 
effectiveness and provided Serbian troops the means to deceive.  General Clark’s primary 
concern was the safety of his pilots.  His concerns are the reason why there was a 15,000 
foot limitation on all manned aircraft in the combat zone.  This limitation made it almost 
impossible for pilots to locate and identify actual militarily valuable target. Since drone 
aircraft are flown without an on-board pilot, this limitation could have been avoided.  The 
pilot of an Unmanned Aerial System flies from a secure location miles away.  
Requirements like target identification and destruction are carried out by a team of 
trained individuals.  This alleviates the pilot from having to have visual contact with the 
target before it is destroyed.  His only concern is to fly the drone The target acquisition 
teams have the luxury of utilizing  special sensors that can be mounted on a drone.  
Without going into too much detail, these sensors can have a high capacity for zoom, 
infrared capabilities (to look for heat signature), night vision, and possibly Measurement 
and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT).  
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence is scientific and technical 
intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, 
plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for 
the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the 
source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or 
measurement of the same (Pike, 2000). 
With these types of capabilities, analysts have the ability to find the target and 
verify its authenticity without the pressure of fatigue and the requirement to control the 
aircraft. Once the target is properly acquired and confirmed as authentic (not a decoy) 
with real time information, the destruction of the target can be confirmed.  According to 
Major Christopher Gough, Aviano AB F-16 pilot in Operation Allied Force; “destruction 
of a target was fairly simple. The overriding issue was finding and identifying the 
targets” (Christopher Gough, personal interview, July 17, 2006).  A system that is on 
most combat aircraft called LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared 
for Night) has the capability to hit a target from 25,000’ via laser guidance.  Drones with 
this type of technology could have easily avoided the deception tactics utilized by the 
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Serbian armies whether they were at low altitudes or above 15,000 feet.  Real time video 
would have prevented Serbian troops from replacing actual targets with decoys.   
One other limitation that has not been discussed was the rule imposed by 
politicians.  “Aircraft were not allowed to land with unexpended ordinance on board” 
(Thomas, 2000).  This would be far less of a limitation to a UAS.  UASs have no real 
reason to land except to re-fuel and obtain more ordinance.  Manned aircraft have to land 
because of the pilot’s physical limitations.  Without a pilot, and with the ability to utilize 
air-refueling assets, a drone can stay in the air for virtually an unlimited amount of time. 
So, if there was a rule that the aircraft could not land until all its ordinance was expended, 
the drone could literally stay in the air until it had identified and destroyed as many 
targets as weapons on board.  This benefit would have prevented wasted ordinance being 
dropped into the Adriatic Sea and lowered the number of sorties required.  
2. Environment 
Pilot fatigue, weather, and the mountainous terrain played a significant role in the 
Serbian’s deception campaign.  A great advantage of UASs is the lessening of pilot 
fatigue.  Since multiple F-16 UASs could be flown by one pilot, dozens of F-16 UASs 
could be flown to a certain destination.  Once the pilot positions these F-16 UASs, he 
could get out of the drone control cockpit and dozens of fresh pilots could replace him to 
individually fly each drone for re-fueling and combat.  Once combat is completed, only 
one pilot would be required to fly them back. 
According to Major Gough; “The weather is always a factor in air campaigns, and 
certainly, Kosovo’s rugged terrain presented challenges. However, it was not bad enough 
to cause too much of a hazard for us to complete our mission” (Christopher Gough, 
personal interview, July 17, 2005).  The LANTIRN system could have easily guided the 
pilots through the bad weather and terrain.  The biggest problem with the weather was the 
requirement for the pilots to visually identify the target.  As discussed in the limitations 





3. Battle Damage Assessment 
With the ability to properly identify and destroy targets, drones would have 
provided an accurate count and detailed videos of the Serbian assets destroyed. With this 
type of evidence, the Serbian campaign to thwart NATO would have been limited 
significantly.  
4. Search and Rescue 
Search and rescue teams will always be required to help those in need.  However, 
drones may make search and rescue teams an obsolete requirement for downed combat 
pilot.  There is no need to risk a team of 30 plus individuals to save a downed UAS.  If a 
UAS is shot down, the only loss is a piece of equipment that can be remotely destroyed.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
During the Kosovo campaigns, UASs could have easily saved the American 
government and NATO billions of dollars and significant embarrassment. They would 
have been better able to overcome Serbian deception techniques, and would have 
prevented both the waste of ordinance and unnecessary post-flight expenditures.  The F-
16 UAS would not have been hampered by the  many limiting factors placed on combat 
pilots during the operation and could have helped provide an accurate battle damage 
assessment. It is clear that the Kosovo/OAF conflict points to UASs as the best option for 
an inexpensive, low risk, high impact weapon system in future operations.  
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V. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA 
War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace 
—Thomas Mann 
 
A. WHAT ABOUT ETHICS? 
Ethics is a critical subject when it comes to unmanned, autonomous, or robotic 
systems.  Many scholars feel that developing systems that have artificial intelligence 
capabilities a kin to creating a new type of life form.  If these systems are considered a 
life form then is it ethically acceptable to program these systems to do the dirty work for 
humans against other humans?  Scholars feel this is a type of artificial slavery.  While 
these debates continue to be discussed, the F-16 UAS is not an autonomous system and is 
under human control during the entirety of its combat mission.  Never the less there are 
other ethical concerns. 
1. Diplomacy 
According to the Secretary of Defense UAS mission roadmap, unmanned weapon 
systems represent the future of war.  They will reduce the risk to pilots’ lives to zero, 
significantly decrease defense spending, and take accuracy and capabilities to a new 
plateau.  However, in an effort to capture all the advantages and disadvantages of 
unmanned technology I find the biggest possible disadvantage could be political ethics.   
This problem should not be overlooked.  Since unmanned technology reduces the 
risk-of-life decision to zero, will the effort to seek peaceful solutions also be reduced?  
Going to war is a very difficult decision because a nation must weigh its options.  It must 
decide whether risking the lives of its citizens is worth the principles or issues being 
fought for.  This decision process and its negative consequences is what make countries 
seek peaceful solutions.  By employing unmanned technology in wars diplomacy might 
conceivably become a thing of the past.  If there is no risk of losing lives, war could be an 
easier decision.  There are no negotiations to worry about.  Conflict could become an all 




We were defeated by one thing only —  
by the inferior science of our enemies. 
—Arthur C. Clarke 
 
America is currently engaged in multiple wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and a global 
war on terrorism.  According to John Arquilla, Professor of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, “It seems that the Department of Defense feels each of these wars can easily be 
won through advanced technologies” (lecture, 2006, July 11) .  Billons of American tax 
dollars are being spent on research and development in advanced weapons systems, like 
the F-22 and F-35 fighters.  These two programs are only the pinnacle weapons systems 
being developed for the Air Force.  The other military branches have their multi-billion 
dollar weapons system projects too.  America is so focused on developing tools of the 
future that it is forgetting the here and now.  Warfare in the future may well need a 
system like the UCAV.  A fleet of UCAVs by 2030 is in my opinion, a very admirable 
goal.  America should continue to work toward this goal.  One never knows what the 
future will hold.  A UCAV force may just be what is needed in future warfare.  However, 
spending billions of dollars on a transitional weapon system like the F-22 is is hard to 
justify.  Even though American air power is threatened by surface-to-air weapon systems 
and hand held anti-aircraft systems, it is still the most powerful force in the world.  No 
country can currently challenge America’s power for airspace control.  The Department 
of Defense needs to accept a plan that will maintain a good enough status until the UCAV 
fleet becomes operational.   
This good enough process allows our country to take advantage of low cost 
advancements in current technology.  Precision bombings are something that is needed in 
all the wars in which America presently engaged. However, is precision bombing going 
to require an advanced weapon system like the F-22?  None of our current adversaries 
have an opposing force that can come close to challenging American air superiority.  For 
this reason the F-16 UAS is the perfect interim solution.  The F-16 is a current 
technology that needs only a few advancements to sustain our Air Supremacy edge until 
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the UCAV fleet is operational.  By converting the F-16 UAS the United States Air Force 
could develop a fleet of weapon systems that would be easily adequate for the tasks at 
hand, while reducing the military budget by tens of billions of dollars over 25-years.  
This savings could be re-routed to fund a host of other working projects. 
We should be mindful that a preoccupation with developing superior technology 
was also the route taken by the German Nazis.  They were excessively fixated on 
developing technologically advanced weapons that did little to improve their strategic 
situation.  Their “V-weapons program cost over 5 billion marks, and absorbed tens of 
thousands of workers.  The resources that went to build them could, according to the 
American Bombing Survey, have produced an additional 24,000 aircraft” (Overy, 1995).  
According to John Arquilla; “The whole Nazi fleet only had a little over 2000 aircraft. 
Imagine what it could have done with an additional 24,000” (lecture, 2006, July 11).  If 
the German military did have an additional 24,000 aircraft the possibilities are 
frightening.  Fortunately for us, while the German scientists pioneered the world’s most 
advanced weapons –rockets, jets, atomic weapons-its forces lacked adequate support to 
fight the war in which they were engaged (Overy, 1995).  They spent billions of marks on 
projects at the very frontiers of military science which brought almost no advantage 
(Overy, 1995).  “The paradox can be explained in part by the warped outlook of 
Germany’s leaders, who persuaded themselves as the war began to turn against them that 
German science could conjure up a new generation of fantastic weaponry that could 
reverse the war’s course at a stroke” (Overy, 1995).  The resulting approach was 
disastrous. 
One can only hope that the Department of Defense is not walking the same road.  
Hopefully, it is not so focused on developing dramatically superior weapons that it loses 
track of the wars at hand.  Additionally, one must remember that technological 
advancement introduces both opportunity and vulnerability.  No matter how inferior or 
superior ones technological base, it only needs the human mind to discover an innovative 
solution to countering it.  The mind is and always will be the most innovative and 




3.  Other 
The greater the difficulty the more glory in surmounting it.  
Skillful pilots gain their reputation from storms and tempests. 
—Epicurus Greek philosopher (341 BC - 270 BC) 
 Flying an aircraft in battle is very romantic.  The pilot who is able to survive the 
storm is a hero.  There is little romance in flying an unmanned weapon system.  The pilot 
gets into a simulator and safely gets back out.  There is no danger involved.  Romance 
may be the reason why governments are spending billions of dollars to create the perfect 
manned flying system.  It may also be the reason why many individuals involved in the 
flight arena are so opposed to unmanned aerial platforms fighting the wars.  Unmanned 
systems take away the glory.  In WWII the German navy also felt this way about 
submarines.  There was nothing sexy about submarines, so they did not produce them in 
sufficient quantities.  However, the few submarines that they did have caused the most 
sea damage during the war.  As Professor Arquilla notes, “the German navy spent over 
80% of its budget on battleships” (lecture, 2006, July 11).  The German navy was so bent 
on developing a glorious naval fleet that it overlooked its most powerful navy asset.  
Imagine what the German navy could have done if it spent its budget on submarines 
instead of battleships.  It may have won the war.  However, the glory of having a huge 
naval fleet proved the Navy’s demise.  The glory factor actually raises two separate 
ethical concerns; 1) Is it ethically right to use unmanned weapons systems against 
people?  2) Is it ethically right to deny the development of inexpensive unmanned 
systems to satisfy personal desire?  Hopefully, American leadership can properly tackle 
ethical concerns in mitigating the glory factor. 
 
B. SUMMARY 
Such ethical concerns may be nothing or it may be everything.  There are 
theoretical horrors that could undermine the development of unmanned weapon systems.  
No matter how easy war becomes by utilizing unmanned weapons they still kill.  The 
difficult road to seek peace is and always will be the best solution.  One can only hope 
that intelligent individuals are working on solutions to these ethical dilemmas instead of 
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worrying about the rights of artificial life forms.  The superiority concern makes one 
wonder why must the superior technology always be sought.  Why can’t we find and 
utilize the best solution for the situations at hand.  Will the superiority factor contribute to 













THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK 
57 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The F-16 UAS is an alternative solution.  It is a system that will allow the United 
States Government to maintain Air Supremacy until a UCAV fleet is operational.  It can 
provide an increase in current weapon system capabilities, reduce the risk-of-life factor to 
zero, decrease budget costs, and allow technological advancements on an old airframe.  
Chapter I provides an overview of unmanned technologies and their advantages as well 
as their disadvantages.  Chapter II provides a cost comparison of the F-16, F-22 and the 
F-16 UAS.  Chapter III provides an analytical view of the F-16 UAS through the Nash 
Arbitration model.  The Nash Arbitration model suggests that the F-16 UAS is a good 
compromise and has the ability to increase the American government’s air power 
significantly further than the F-16 and F-22.  The savings outlined in Chapters II and III 
do not even consider the budget costs saved from other areas of significance.  These areas 
include reduced search and rescue requirements, cruise missile productions, carrier fleet 
operations costs, and a number of other reductions.  Chapter IV suggests that the F-16 
UAS could have increased the success of the Bosnian/OAF situation.  Finally, Chapter V 
provides a few ethical concerns to be considered before the American government can 
truly decide whether the unmanned aircraft decision is the proper course for the future. 
In an overall assessment, the F-16 UAS is an inexpensive, highly advanced 
solution for American air supremacy.  One could only hope that the United States 
government is willing to spend a few million dollars in developing the F-16 UAS to test 
this thesis’ hypothesis.  The results may or may not be the answer to deploying maximum 
airpower at minimum cost.  However, if the F-16 UAS is never built, the answer to the 
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